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Pure Power and Power in Trust
A short comment upon a recent English case1 seems justified in the 
light of the very clear distinction drawn dv Harman J. between a power 
of appointment and a trust. So much has been written upon the prob­
lems involved in the meeting of powers and trusts that it is sufficient 
for the moment to refer to the New Brunswick case of Re Gilbert' where 
Harrison J. refers to some of the literature dealing with gifts to persons 
to be selected bv trustees or others from among the meniDers of a speci­
fied class and the problems arising in such situations when the selection 
is not made: was it a power only, in which case the property results back 
to the settlor’s estate (in the absence of a gift over in default of appoint­
ment) or was there a gift to all members of the class equally either by 
way of an implied gift to all members or by way of an argument that the 
power was held in trust to be cxerciscd and if not exercised, the court 
would carry out the trust bv giving to all potential beneficiaries. The 
result of either route in the second alternative may appear to be the same 
so far as those persons who are members of a definite class arc concerned: 
thcv take equailv in default of appointment.
W here the class is indefinite or one with a variable content at 
am particular moment the result is not reached so easily. If the solution 
is by way of trust, problems are raised as to whether the requirements for 
validity of an ordinary trust arc to be made applicable to a power held in 
trust. It would seem that a power alone, apart from trust (and apart 
for the moment from any testamentary problem) is valid whether it be a 
general power, a spccial power to select from the members of a definite 
class of persons, or an intermediate power which is neither general nor 
restricted to a definite class—i.e., a class all of whose members can at anv 
moment be identified. Does it make any difference if either the power 
is held in trust or the propertv to be appointed is held in trust and the 
power of selection is to be made by the trustee? And if it docs make a 
difference in the second case, can there be a pure power, unfettered bv 
trust problems, exercisable with respect to propertv neld in trust, even bv 
the trustee?
The first question is raised in part bv the trust rule that the metes 
and bounds of the trust must be sufficiently marked out so that the 
court can enforce. There is no problem where the limits of the class 
are clearly defined as in the Gilbert case15—“descendants . . .  of my late 
Father Henry Gilbert” at the appropriate date, remembering (a) a prior 
life estate to A, (b) the power was to be exercised by the will of the donee 
who was herself given a life estate if she survived A. And it can be 
argued that where the power is general it amounts to a beneficial gift, 
even though this may involve some strained reasoning because of the 
trust. But what of the intermediate type of power? Clauson J. had held 
in Re Park:< that a power to appoint to anyone other than the donee of 
the Dower was valid in these circumstances: residue of estate given by will 
to a trustee to pay the income to such person or persons (other than
1. Re  G este tn er  119531 1 All E .R  1150.
2. 119481 3 D .L .R. 27
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herself) or charitablc institution or institutions and in such shares and 
proportions as Jane Armstrong should from time to time during her 
lifetime direct in writing, and after her death capital (and any income 
not appointed) to a named charity. His lordship noted the requirement 
that a trust must be spelled out so that the court can, if necessary, 
enforce it. But this trust was quite definite and marked out: the income 
was to go, if Jane Armstrong designated a person or charity, to that per­
son or cnaritv. If not, it was to go to the named charity. Quite clear, his 
lordship declared. This view was followed in Re Jones4 where the 
power was to appoint to any person living at the death of the donee, 
thus excluding corporations. Clauson J. had emphasized in Re Parks1 
that the donee of the power was not a trustee.
Now Ja n e  A rm stron g is not a trustee. If she refused to act in the m atter  
th e C ou rt could not ap p oin t an o th er person to act in her place.'1
In this state of the law Re Gestetner' came before Harman J. No 
testamentary problem was involved. It was an inter vivos trust created 
bv Gestetner bv way of transfer of £100,000 to trustees to applv the 
income and the capital or such portions of each as they thought fit for 
such member or members of a class composed of four named individuals, 
five named charities, any descendant of tne settlor’s father or of his uncle 
J. G., any spouse, widow or widower of the persons so far included, any 
person for the time being a former emplovee of the settlor or of his 
wife or who was for the time being the widow' or widower of a former 
employee, any person for the time being a director, emplovee, former 
director or former employee or the spouse, etc. of a former emplovee or 
former director of Gestetner Ltd. or of any company of which the 
directors for the time included any one or more of the persons who were 
for the time being directors of Gestetner Ltd., but excluding from the 
class the settlor, any wife of the settlor and any trustee. Subject to and 
in default of such selection, there was a trust in favour of tne settlor’s 
children (and their representatives) and in default of such children or 
issue to a named charity. Care was taken to avoid the perpetuity problem. 
The problem of the trust’s validity was put before tne court bv the 
trustees who had paid some of the income to one of the five charities 
(not the residuary charity) in exercise of their power of selection. T he 
tax authorities had declined to remit the tax deducted at the source on 
the ground that the trusts (or at least some of them) were invalid be­
cause the membership in the class was so wide as to make the settlement 
uncertain and to cause a resulting trust in favour of the settlor.
It was argued at the hearing of the motion by those attacking the 
trusts that the power of selection, being a power coupled with a dutv, 
a power held in trust, was bad because it was impossible to know the 
limits of the area of selection — “that is to say, though the trustees
3 119321 1 Ch. 580.
4. 119451 Ch. 105 (V aisey  J .> .
5. Ibid., a t p. 582. D ou bt has been  cast on th e v a lid ity  o f both  o f th ese  cases in  th e  
H igh C ourt of A u stra lia  in T a th am  v. H uxtab le  11950 ) 81 C .L .R . 639 in th e ju d g m e n t 
of F u lla g a r J .  T h e  m ain  problem  th ere , how ev er, w as testam en tary , and w ill b e  
noted  la te r.
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can at any moment tell whether John Doc or Richard Doc is a person 
within the power, they cannot tell how many more people there may 
be who ma\ be within it” . The case was argued throughout on the 
admission of all parties (five interests including the tax authorities were 
represented) that the class was “not one ascertainable at any given 
time, bccausc it is a fluctuating body . . .  it is impossible to know at 
any one moment the names of all the members of the specified class.” 
But Harman J. held that it was not necessary, in connexion with 
every power, to know all the objects in order to appoint to one of them. 
“There is much to be said for the view” that such Knowledge was neces­
sary if the power was coupled with a duty to distribute. His lordship 
referred to the Park and Jones cases for the view that if there was 
no dutv, the power may be not merely general or special, but also 
“betwixt and Detween” where the membership is less definite, and to 
Re Ogden'1 for the view that where there was a duty to distribute — to 
exercise the power — then there must be a certainty among the recip­
ients. His lordship also referred to Farwell’s view that if the power be 
a power not involving a duty to distribute, it is not necessary to know 
all possible objects at the moment of exercise. In application to the 
facts of the Gestetner case, Herman J. held that despite the inability of 
the trustees to release the power absolutely (one of the terms of the 
settlement), there was not any duty on the trustees to distribute either 
income or capital in whole or in part among the members of the 
class. The settlement by its terms made provision for a gift over to the 
extent that the power of selection was not exercised.
In the view of the court, as there was no duty to distribute (even 
assuming a duty to consider) under the Gestetner instrument “it does 
nut seem to me that there is any authority binding on me to sav 
that this whole trust is bad or that this whole power is bad”. His lord­
ship added that there was no difficulty in ascertaining whether any 
postulant was a member of the class—“if that could not be ascertained 
the matter would be quite different.”
T h e re  being no un certainly in th at sense. I am reluctan t to introduce a 
m otion of u n certain ty  in the o th er sense, hy saying th at the trustees m ust 
w orry th eir heads to  survey the world from  China to  P eru , w here there  
are  perfectly good objects of the class in England . . . T h e re  is no u n ­
certain ty  in so far as it is i|uite certain  w hether p articu lar  individuals 
are  objects of the power. W h at is not certa in  is how m any objects there  
are ; and it does not seem to me that such an u n certain ty  will invalidate a 
trust worded in this way.7
In effect, though there was a power to select vested in trustees, 
the court carefully separated the power from the trust. The require­
ment of certainty in the latter was at all times met. The cestuis que 
trust were those selected upon selection, and until selection or in de­
fault of selection in whole or in part, they were the settlor’s children 
and issue, and in default, the charity. The selection when made was 
quite definite and certain. And his lordship twice pointed out that it 
^as possible at any time to ascertain whether any individual selected
6. 119331 Ch. 678 (L ord  Tom lin».
7. 11953] 1 A ll E .R . 1150, at p. 1156.
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was within the class. That is, with respect, a very salutorv decision. 
So much has been said in the name of ‘ uncertainty” recently (e.g. the 
Diplock case") that the occasional simple analysis by an English judge 
of the fundamentals of some of our legal concepts is extremely re­
freshing.
Earlier it was asked whether the combination of trust and power 
altered the rules that would otherwise be applicable to each had they 
been standing alone. It would seem that if the power is a pure power 
and not one to be exercised, then the power is no different from any 
other power, even though the property which is the subject matter of 
the power is held in trust and the donee of the power is the trustee 
(a factual point of difference from the Park case). It would also seem 
that if the power is held in trust, on the basis of the obiter in the 
Gestetner case, that the rules about the metes and bounds of the 
trust being marked out with certainty must equally apply to the power.”
W hat arc the implications of the Gestetner decision? The 
suggestion that a power as such is valid even though all objects may not 
be ascertainable at the moment, as long as it can be ascertained whe­
ther. a particular person is within or without the class, leads to three 
questions. In the Gestetner case all potential objects were individuals 
with the exception of fixe named charities, and were defined largely in 
an inclusive manner, rather than the exclusive manner of Re Park. 
Would the trust have still been valid if it had been one for all the 
world except the settlor, his spouse for the time being and the trustees 
(the same exceptions as in the Gestetner case)? There is no reason why 
it should not be valid.10
Secondly, would the power have been valid if it had been in favour 
of corporations (other than charitable corporations) defined by such 
words as “benevolent,” “philanthropic,” ‘recreational” remembering 
that in the view of Harman }. it is not necessary to know the metes 
and bounds of the power as long as we can ascertain whether any pro­
posed beneficiary falls within the class — i.e., is “benevolent” etc. Again 
there is no reason why such words should not b  capable of this 
limited interpretation, even though their full ambit may not be defin­
able. However, this may be a point of separation between Re Gestet­
ner, where any object, when picked out for examination, could be
8. R e  D iplock; m b  nom. C hichester  Diocesan Board v. S im pson [1944] A.C. 341.
9. A  fu ll discussion o f th is  point is reserved , h ow ever. A d d ition al obiter  in  th e  sam e 
case a lso  suggested a fu r th er d iffe re n ce  from  o rd in ary  pow ers w h ere th e  pow er is 
h eld  in tru st to  b e  ex e rc ise d — th a t all p o ten tia l o b je c ts  m ay jo in  to g e th er and ag ree  
to  ta k e  th e  p rop erty  in eq u al sh ares (or an y  u n equ al basis th ey  ag ree u p o n ?), and  
th a t th ey  could pu t an end to  th e tru st and to  th e  pow er b y  com ing  to  co u rt and 
seek in g  d istrib u tio n . T o  th e  e x te n t th a t th is  Is tru e o f an o rd in ary  tru st, it w ould 
seem  to  follow  th a t  it  m ight apply to  a pow er held  in  tru st. (A gain , th is  p o in t is 
reserv ed  fo r fu ll an a ly sis  a t a n o th er tim e.)
10. I t  w ill be  n oticed  th a t th is  qu estion  ra ises an issue as to  w h eth e r th e re  w as an y  
u n ce rta in ty  in  th e  G este tner  case  a t a ll —  d ifficu lty  in  asce rta in in g  m em b ersh ip  o f 
a c lass  is n ot u n ce rta in ty  ,and no tru st and th e re fo re , it  w ould seem , pow er w ill 
fa ll ju s t  becau se o f d ifficu lty  in  ascerta in in g  th e  b e n e fic ia r ie s  or o b je c ts , as lon g  
as th e  m etes and bounds are  m ark ed  out. T h u s ev en  If th is  pow er had b een  h eld  
in tru st m ig ht it h ave been  v alid  if th e in itia l assum ption  on w h ich  th e case w as 
argu ed  w as cast o verb oard ?
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declared to be within or without the class, whereas, in such cases as 
“benevolent” and similar objects outside of the charitable field, the 
description i3 at one end indefinite so that it may not be simple to 
sav that objects A and B are benevolent and objects Y and Z are not 
But cxactlv where the line in between falls is truly uncertain in the 
legal sense and, for simple powers, should this difference matter?
Thirdly, will the Gestetner view of powers be carried over into the 
tcstamentarv field? Most statements that a man may not leave it 
to others to make a will for him are careful to except powers of ap­
pointment. If general and special powers created by will are valid, why 
not those in the Gestetner type of case, had the power there been 
created by will? Re Park held such a testamentary power valid. That 
was a single judge. In the High Court of Australia, Fullagar J. has 
suggested that case is wrong as being an invalid delegation of the 
testamentary power, but Kitto J. does not go that far — he seems to 
recognize that the House of Lords dicta against delegation, and there 
has been a lot of it latelv culminating in the Diplock ease, leaves avail­
able to testators all valid powers which are pure powers and which are 
certain enough to allow the court to say whether any particular bene­
ficiary selected by the donee of the power is within it. Latham C. J. did 
not discuss the point. The remarks of Fullagar and Kitto JJ. might be 
considered obiter if the power there involved could be said to be held 
in trust. 11
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